Tell-tale signs of a Weak Leader?

“Also likely to incite this eruption of violence was PNoy’s reversal of Arroyo’s other policy of demanding ceasefire before talking peace. Plainly, when negotiations are conducted amid fighting, insurgents have a huge incentive to mount assaults with the triple objectives of expanding control, amassing weapons and ‘revolutionary taxes’, and degrading state forces—thus, boosting the insurgents’ position on the battlefield as well as the negotiating table...This month alone, NPA firefights were reported in Compostela Valley, Agusan, Surigao, North Cota-bato, Negros, and Mindoro.”

Tell-tale signs of a weak leader?

By: Ricardo Saludo

Along with our countrymen, this writer expresses heartfelt sympathy and sadness for families and friends of nearly 30 soldiers killed by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front last week. Just two days after the death of 19 Scout Rangers in Basilan last Tuesday, another eight soldiers fell, the MILF claimed.

If one’s memory of the Arroyo years serves this former Cabinet member right, last week’s casualties are the worst losses sustained by our courageous fighting men in the past decade at least. The MILF seems bent on catching up with the ferocity of the communist New People’s Army, which has intensified its own assaults nationwide since Benigno Aquino 3rd became president.

This month alone, NPA firefights were reported in Compostela Valley, Agusan, Surigao, North Cota-bato, Negros, and Mindoro. Insurgents also burned equipment in Bukidnon and Negros, and kidnapped a Surigao del Sur mayor and his two military escorts. Provincial Governor Johnny Pimentel warning of more abductions.

Then there were the recent attacks on three Surigao del Norte mines, which even prompted a stern statement from New York-based Human Rights Watch. That plea for peace fell on deaf ears: the communists have threatened more foreign-operated mines.

Rebel assaults have escalated since July 2010 despite President Aquino’s scrapping of his predecessor’s firm no-ceasefire-no-peace-talks policy and her counter-insurgency campaign combining military action with development initiatives. A few months after repeating the ceasefire-first line in his 2010 State of the Nation Address, PNoy went ahead with negotiations.

Then, in place of the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Bantay Laya strategy, which trimmed NPA forces and influence by a quarter during Gloria Arroyo’s rule, PNoy launched the Bayanihan program with a reduced security component. The AFP even dropped the ‘communist-terrorists’ (CT) tag in favor of CNN (for Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army-National Democratic Front).

Now, some are wondering if the insurgents were, in fact, emboldened by, not despite, PNoy’s about-face from Arroyo’s tough tack.

Consider a few things. First, anti-government groups normally crank up their activities, peaceful or armed, to test a fresh administration. Some rebels might ease off the trigger if a new Commander-in-Chief pulls back the troops from a decade of relentless counter-insurgency. But it is just as likely if not more so for insurgents to take advantage of AFP restraint for battlefield resurgence. Just imagine what radiator water does when the cap is opened.

Also likely to incite this eruption of violence was PNoy’s reversal of Arroyo’s other policy of demanding ceasefire before talking peace. Plainly, when negotiations are conducted amid fighting, insurgents have a huge incentive to mount assaults with the triple objectives of expanding control, amassing weapons and ‘revolutionary taxes’, and degrading state forces—thus, boosting the insurgents’ position on the battlefield as well as the negotiating table. The temptation to attack is even greater when the military is prevented from responding in kind.

With the MILF there is a further trigger to attack: any perceived violation of Muslim freedom and territory. In 2000 then President Joseph Estrada waged all-out war and took the Front’s Camp Abubakar headquarters. On December 30 that year, Manila’s worst terrorist bombings hit commuter trains and malls. Arroyo, for her part, faced attacks by MILF units after the military took its Buliok base and when the Supreme Court blocked talks on Muslim ancestral domains.

What PNoy move could have ignited Basilan? Notably, the assault happened days after the High Court narrowly cleared the law postponing this year’s election for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and empowering the President to appoint ARMM officials. While the MILF expressed no open protest, countless Muslims oppose the scheme, including rebels fighting to be free of Manila’s power.

It doesn’t help restrain rebel violence that President Aquino has come across as a less hands-on, proactive security and crisis leader than the past three Commanders-in-Chief. Fidel Ramos was a former Armed Forces chief; Erap continues to advocate all-out war. While Arroyo faced down coup plotters and hostage takers, Aquino was largely unseen when terrorism and calamity struck.

Moreover, his surprise Tokyo meeting with MILF Chairman Murad Ebrahim—a huge concession and propaganda win for the Front—and PNoy’s pursuit of talks with “CNN” sans ceasefire, may have signaled an overriding desire to sign peace pacts at all costs. The President’s response to the Rangers’ deaths may further buttress this view.

“The instruction,” reported AFP operations chief Brig. Gen. Jose Mabanta after PNoy’s October 21 command conference, “was that operations against the MILF should not be pursued because of the existing ceasefire.” Nor will the government press for the arrest of rogue commander Dan Laksaw Asnawi who allegedly led the Basilan attack.

Sadly, that stance may lead to more sacrifices for our heroic men in uniform.