CHINA the bully is back..!

CHINA the bully is back..!

by Ric Saludo

“What then should the Philippines do? First, it’s time for the Palace to bring in seasoned regional security experts to give advice and help manage the shifting and potentially explosive Spratly situation, like Sen. Enrile, former National Security Adviser and now Congressman Roilo Golez, and even former president, defense secretary and armed force chief Fidel Ramos… Lastly, we must join hands with our allies in Asean and Asia, plus the United States, and press China to forge agreement on the code of conduct and comply with it.”

With the Philippines lacking any serious military capability to match Chinese moves in the Spratlys, Malacañang the other day floated hopeful remarks that the United States would come to our aid under the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) if there is conflict. US Ambassador Harry Thomas Jr. then answered media queries with the standard US state department line that his country would not take sides in a territorial dispute.

But yesterday, most likely after he was told what President Obama wishes the Philippines and Asean to hear, Thomas said, “I want to assure you that on all subjects we in the United States are with the Philippines. The Philippines and the United States are strategic treaty allies. We are partners. We will continue to consult and work with each other on all issues, including the West Philippines Sea and Spratly Islands.” The American ambassador apparently used the new Philippine government term for the South China Sea.

Administration allies quickly agreed with Thomas’ earlier words. Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile knew the MDT inside out as a legal luminary and former longtime defense secretary. He said the Philippines could not invoke the treaty in the Spratlys. Senators Franklin Drilon and Chiz Escudero, normally supportive of Malacañang, scolded its spokespersons for constantly harping on US backing.
If the message isn’t clear enough, listen to Chito Sta. Romana. He was ABC’s longtime Beijing news bureau chief, joining the American network after he and other activists had to settle in China when martial law was declared in the Philippines in 1972. He told a weekend forum that China would not back down in the South China Sea, and Washington would put greater value of its relations with Beijing than with Manila. Besides hundreds of billions of dollars in trade and investment between America and China, including over $1 trillion on US Treasury bills in China’s foreign currency reserves, Washington needs Beijing’s cooperation in addressing a host of global and regional issues.
But these considerations need not contradict a new US policy to show its old friends that it can now be relied on. In a multi-polar world, the US, which wants to continue being a major force in Asia, must prove to the Philippines and the others in Asean, that it is still more advantageous for them to be America’s “strategic partners than to not be.”

So are we all by our defenseless selves in the increasingly turbulent waters of the so-called West Philippine Sea? Maybe not, after all. But it’s complicated.

The US has repeatedly said it wants freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, with no less than Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reiterating last year that Washington wants the sea lanes kept open. One big reason: maintaining unfettered flow of Middle East oil to top allies Japan and South Korea. So if the Chinese Navy starts stopping, boarding, or otherwise interfering with shipping on the high seas, the Hawaii-based Seventh Fleet would respond.

What about the Spratlys? The US has called for restraint in the disputed islets and waters, and urged compliance with the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The DoC affirms freedom on navigation and overflight, and adopts measures to maintain peace and avoid provocation. They include limiting the deployment of military forces and facilities in disputed areas.
Asean and China have been holding talks toward a binding code of conduct (see March 7, 9, 11, and June 3 columns), but Beijing opposes any involvement by the US in the arrangement. If agreement is reached, it would help stabilize the area, although there remain concerns that China could still violate the accord, as it may have done to the DoC by expanding facilities and military deployment in the South China Sea in recent years.

Now if China decides to opt out, Asean could adopt the code on its own—and enlist US support for it. Washington already supports the current non-binding DoC, so backing a binding agreement seems well within its policy. Moreover, a conflict-avoiding, confidence-building code of conduct would be in line with the US push for a ‘regional architecture’ of institutions and accords to address issues and disputes in Asia.

The big sticking point, of course, is that China opposes American involvement in the South China Sea or other matters between itself and Asean. If Washington does not support Asean in the code, then it would cast doubt not only on the regional architecture initiative, but possibly on US security alliances with Southeast Asian nations. That could very well lead them to submit to Beijing and fall within its sway.

The same loss of confidence in America could happen if it left the Philippines alone in a Spratlys conflict. This may well be part of China’s strategy in the current tiff with the Philippines. Indeed, Beijing began testing Washington’s mettle in the South China Sea in 2009, when ships of the People’s Liberation Army confronted a US civilian research vessel in international waters off Hainan Island.

China’s more assertive stance coincides with its surge of confidence since the 2008 Beijing Olympics affirmed its world stature, and the 2009 global economic crisis and recession cut the West’s clout. At the height of the US financial debacle, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner had to persuade Beijing not to lose faith in the dollar and unload its $1-trillion hoard of T-bills. There were similar representations last week when credit rating agencies intimated that US debt could be downgraded if there is no significant progress in addressing its mammoth budget deficit.

Will America then avoid confronting China in the Spratlys for fear of economic retaliation? Beijing would probably be careful not to do or say anything that could trigger widespread dumping of dollars. That would not only diminish the value of its international reserves, but also hurt its export-led economy, especially if the renminbi skyrocketed in value as the greenback collapsed, and the US, China’s largest export market, plunged into another recession. And of course, any nasty action would poison relations and degrade economic exchanges with America and much of Asia too.

Still, Washington cannot expect a sympathetic ear in Beijing on financial issues while it is risking military confrontation with the PLA in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, all Asia would be watching how reliable an ally America is during crunch time. Hence, Washington, like every other player in the Spratlys conundrum, has to play its cards very carefully to avoid an unwanted escalation of tensions and hardening of positions.

That might just encourage China to further assert its position and enhance its advantage in the dispute areas, especially before a binding code of conduct firmly bans more or larger facilities and forces in the South China Sea. Beijing could also be spurred to aggressive moves by the Aquino Administration, which has shown itself inexperienced in handling crises and clumsy in conducting diplomacy.

What then should the Philippines do? First, it’s time for the Palace to bring in seasoned regional security experts to give advice and help manage the shifting and potentially explosive Spratly situation, like Sen. Enrile, former National Security Adviser and now Congressman Roilo Golez, and even former president, defense secretary and armed force chief Fidel Ramos. Even better, a full strategy could be drawn up and affirmed in a full meeting of the National Security Council.

Part of that strategy should be a medium-term program to boost external defense, which should be funded not only to assert sovereignty, but also to protect our patrimony and economic rights within our exclusive economic zone (EEZ) now being claimed by China. The savings from scrimping on defense would be dwarfed by the losses from failing to harness undersea resources due to Chinese intimidation of our exploration vessels. And, much as the thought is abhorred by many, closer military cooperation with the US, including some basing arrangements, should be considered.

Lastly, we must join hands with our allies in Asean and Asia, plus the United States, and press China to forge agreement on the code of conduct and comply with it. Let us consult them too in dealing with the current tensions on the high seas. The Chinese have long insisted that they deal with Spratlys claimants one on one. Let’s not give Beijing that advantage.